The Age of Deception by For the first time, the director of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency and "man in the middle" of the planet's most explosive confrontations speaks out--on his dealings with America, negotiations with Iran, reform and democracy in the Middle East, and the prospects for a future free of nuclear weapons.
Biological and Chemical Weapons by Terrorist organizations using chemical weapons pose a severe threat / Andy Oppenheimer -- Threats from chemical and biological weapons may be overstated / Greg Goebel -- Experts are divided over the risk of a bio-terrorist attack / Marcus Stern -- Threat of terrorists using biological and chemical weapons is exaggerated / Al Mauroni -- The recession has weakened the United States' disaster preparedness / Thomas Frank -- Soviet era laboratories might be used by bioterrorists / Sonia ben Ouagrham-Gormley -- The government needs to prevent abuse of biological research / Stephen Maurer -- The U.S. is struggling to destroy its chemical weapons / Bob Drogin -- Off-shore chemical weapons dump sites may pose a great risk / Nicole Branan -- Iran may seek biological and chemical weapons / Jason Sigger -- North Korea might test biological weapons on its citizens / Gordon Chang.
Nuclear Weapons by The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a serious problem / Conn Hallinan -- The United States can manage a nuclear Iran / Barry R. Posen -- The United States should attack Iran to prevent its use of nuclear weapons / Norman Podhoretz -- Strong sanctions will prevent Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons / Ivo H. Daalder and Philip H. Gordon -- Israel may preemptively strike Iran to prevent its use of nuclear weapons / Peter Brooks -- Israel should not preemptively strike Iran / Bermard Avishai and Reza Aslan -- North Korea is taking steps to end its nuclear weapons program / George W. Bush -- North Korea's efforts to end its nuclear weapons program are inadequate / Jayshree Bajoria -- The United States can contain nuclear proliferation in Pakistan / Michael Krepon -- The threat of nuclear terrorism is real / Matthew Bunn -- Fears that terrorists will obtain nuclear weapons are misplaced / Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley -- The United States should aggressively promote nuclear disarmament / George P. Shultz ... [et al.] -- The United States should resurrect the comprehensive test-ban treaty / Michael O'Hanlon.
Failed Diplomacy by Offers an insider's analysis of developments on the Korean peninsula and how North Korea was able to develop nuclear weapons. Provides a first-hand account of how the Six-Party Talks were initiated, with a step-by-step review of each round of negotiations, detailing the national interests of the key players.
Nuclear Proliferation by There is no greater challenge to global peace today than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing likelihood that terrorists may acquire nuclear material. The papers presented in this report from the Trilateral Commission's 2006 annual meeting in Tokyo offer a comprehensive and insightful overview of this urgent challenge. The authors-from North America, Europe and Pacific Asia-examine the risks posed by nuclear proliferation with particular attention to Iran and North Korea and offer recommendations to prevent nuclear catastrophe.
Going Critical by A decade before being proclaimed part of the "axis of evil," North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze—and pledge ultimately to dismantle—its dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back again—that led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontation provides important lessons for the United States as it grapples once again with a nuclear crisis on a peninsula that half a century ago claimed more than 50,000 American lives and today bristles with arms along the last frontier of the cold war: the De-Militarized Zone separating North and South Korea.
Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge by The North Korean nuclear program is headed in a dangerous direction. Yet the United States and its allies have not set forth a coherent or unified strategy to stop it. This Task Force, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, evaluates the challenges facing the United States in and around the Korean peninsula and assess American options for meeting them. The situation on the peninsula has deteriorated rapidly since October 2002, when North Korea admitted having a secret highly enriched uranium program that put it on course to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. North Korea has since withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, asserted it possess nuclear weapons, and declared that it is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel. Having initially emphasized the need for a negotiated solution, North Korea's recent rhetoric has stressed the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Co-chaired by Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, and directed by Council Senior Fellow Eric Heginbotham, the Task Force makes specific recommendations to help guide U.S. foreign policy: 1) articulate a strategy around which U.S. regional partners can rally; 2) as part of that strategy, engage in a serious negotiating effort with North Korea and test its intentions by proposing an interim agreement; 3) secure the commitment of U.S. allies to take tougher action should talks fail, 4) restore the health of the U.S.-ROK alliance; 5) persuade China to take greater responsibility for resolving the crisis; and 6) appoint a full-time high-level coordinator for Korea.